Abstract-Equivocation rate has been widely used as an information-theoretic measure of security after Shannon [12] . It simplifies problems by removing the effect of atypical behavior from the system. In [11], however, Merhav and Arikan considered the alternative of using guessing exponent to analyze the Shannon's cipher system. Because guessing exponent captures the atypical behavior, the strongest expressible notion of secrecy requires the more stringent condition that the size of the key, instead of its entropy rate, to be equal to the size of the message.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic model of a cryptographic/secrecy system involves a sender Alice who wants to send a message S as secretly as possible to the intended receiver Bob. The basic model of a cryptanalytic attack, on the other hand, involves a cryptanalyst/wiretapper Eve who attempts to learn the secret as much as possible based on her observation Z. How secretly a message is sent, or how much information is leaked, must therefore be quantified before one can design and optimize a 1 This is the condition for a finite system to achieve perfect secrecy as pointed out by Shannon [12] .
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− −−− → {S (n) } {Z (n) } Fig. 1 . Genie-aided correction channel cryptographic system or a cryptanalytic attack for the respective purposes.
The aposteriori probability function P S|Z is a sufficient statistics of the security of the system as it gives all the possible values of the secret and their associated probabilities for every possible realization of the wiretapper's observation. In particular, the important notion of a system being perfectly secure, referred to as perfect secrecy by Shannon [12] , can be characterized as the aposteriori probability equal to the prior, i.e. P S|Z = P S . In other words, Eve's observation is independent of the secret, or equivalently, the system is at the same level of security whether Z is observed or not.
It is convenient to summarize the aposteriori probability function by the index called equivocation H(S|Z). It is roughly the amount of information the wiretapper needs to gather in addition to Z to perfectly recover S. One precise operational meaning of equivocation, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , is the minimum achievable rate for source coding an iid sequence of S (n) with the iid sequence of Z (n) as side information at the decoder. 2 To achieve perfect secrecy, it is necessary and sufficient to have H(S|Z) = H(S). Alice can also try to protect the secret up to an equivocation H(S|Z) below H(S) if perfect secrecy is costly and unnecessary.
The amount of additional information Eve needs to gather to break the system may not reflect how difficult it is to obtain them. For example, getting just one bit of information from Alice or someone who know the secret may require significant effort in the search for that person, followed by lengthy interrogation. In some situations, Eve does not play a passive role of receiving additional information that is concisely stated (i.e. maximally compressed by a genie), but instead plays an active role in identifying and extracting relevant information from disorganized sources. Thus, one should question whether equivocation is applicable for the case of interest, albeit its mathematical convenience.
A natural alternative measure of security, as investigated by Merhav and Arikan [11] , is roughly the ability that Eve perfectly learn the secret from yes/no answers to "Is the secret equal to ...?" type of questions. In the model, Eve sequentially verify her guesses of the secret by asking yes/no questions. The number of guesses and verifications she needs to make until she is within some probability of guessing the secret correctly indicates her effort and ability to extract information about the secret. Sometimes the system itself provides such a verifier which help correct careless mistakes made by the authorized user. This potentially leaks information to unauthorized users who also have access to the verifier, just as in the case of a login system. As a system designer, he may be interested to know how many wrong passwords should be allowed for each session so that the chances of successfully breaking into the account is reasonably small. Although this success probability does not have a way to express the notion of perfect secrecy in general (See Example A.1), it is a natural fit for this problem as it provides the number of trials as an additional parameter to optimize.
In the sequel, we will consider the wiretap channel problem in [2] . A key result from [2] is the single letter characterization of the secrecy capacity, defined as the maximum rate at which the secret can be transmitted to Bob by a block coding scheme with arbitrarily small error probability and the equivocation rate equal to the message rate. Transmitting at rate above this secrecy capacity, one faces the trade-off a lower equivocation rate. Transmitting at rate below the secrecy capacity, however, equivocation rate is capped at the message rate. There seems to be little point in further reducing the rate below secrecy capacity. If one also cares about delay, i.e. how fast the error probability converges to zero, further reducing the rate below secrecy capacity can be beneficial. What is the tradeoff then?
Secrecy comes with a cost of reliability of the authorized decoding. To characterize which level of secrecy and reliability are simultaneously achievable for each rate, we will use the standard notion of error exponents for Bob and Eve in decoding their messages as a measure of reliability. For secrecy, we will use the exponent of the success probability, or success exponent for short, that Eve learns the secret within an exponential number of guesses.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Section III defines the wiretap channel problem we consider. Section IV describes the proposed coding scheme. Section V explains the computation of the success exponent using a technique we call the Overlap Lemma V.2. Section VI explains the computation of the error exponents using the Packing Lemma [3] . Finally, the desired lower bounds on the exponents will be stated in Section VII. Section VIII gives the conclusion and some open problems. For readers who would like to skip to the main result, Section II provides a brief summary of notations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Calligraphic font denotes a set, e.g. A, which is always assumed finite unless otherwise stated. a∈A . R, R + and Z + denotes the set of real numbers, non-negative real numbers, and positive integers. Occasionally without ambiguity, a positive integer L will also be used to denote the set {1, . . . , L} as in l ∈ L. Bold letter such as x denotes an n-sequence {x
. San serif font is used for random variables and stochastic functions, e.g. X, f and W b . P(Y)
X denotes the set of all possible conditional probability distributions P Y|X of a random variable Y taking values from Y, denoted as Y ∈ Y, given a random variable X ∈ X . The (conditional) probability distribution will also be viewed as a row vector (matrix). e.g. P X P Y|X denotes the matrix multiplication, which gives the marginal distribution P Y . P X • P Y|X denotes the direct product, which gives the joint distribution P X,Y of the pair (X, Y) in this case. P n X denotes the n-th direct product such that P X (x) = n i=1 P X (x i ). For any subset A ⊂ X , P X (A) = x∈A P X (x). E(X) denote the expectation of X. δ var (P, Q) denotes the variation distance (25) between P and Q.
Following the notations in [3] for the method of types, P x and P y|x denotes the type (6) and respectively canonical conditional type (8) . 'Canonical' refers to the constraint (for convenience) that P y|x (y|x) = 1/|Y| if P x (x) = 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y. T (n) Q or T Q for short denotes the class of nsequences of type Q. T V (x) denotes the V -shell of x. P n (X ) denotes the set of all types for sequences in X n . V n (Q, Y) (V n (Q) or V n for short) denotes the set of all canonical conditional types V for sequences in Y n . I(Q, V |P ), D(V W |Q), and H(V |P ) are the conditional mutual information (29), divergence (10) and entropy (11) respectively. I(x ∧ y) (20) denotes the empirical mutual information. Equivalently, we write T X := T P X and T Y|X := T P Y|X , which are non-empty if the corresponding distributions are valid (conditional) types.
To express inequality in the exponent for functions in n, we use a n . b n to denote lim sup n→∞ 1 n log a n is no larger than lim inf n→∞ 1 n log b n . A piecewise function will be expressed in terms of |a| + := max{0, a} and |a| − := min{0, a}. Fig. 2 illustrates a single use of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel (W b , W e ) using the dummy random variables X, Y and Z. Alice sends a random variable X through the channel. P X ∈ P(X ) is the probability distribution function/vector
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. Transmission model
of X over the finite set X , such that P X = Pr{X = x} (x ∈ X ) and P X (A) = Pr{X ∈ A} (A ⊂ X ).
The channel is denoted by the pair (W b ∈ P(Y) X , W e ∈ P(Z) X ) of conditional probability distributions. We write W b (X) and W e (X) as the channel output Y and resp. Z observed by Bob and resp. Eve. The conditional distribution P Y|X (y|x) := Pr{Y = y|X = x} equals W b (y|x) for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y, and similarly for P Z|X . For the case of interest, all sets X , Y and Z are finite and the correlation between Y and Z given X need not be specified.
To transmit information through this channel, we will consider the (data) transmission model illustrated in Fig. 3 with block length n. Following [2] , we consider n uses of the channel with stochastic encoding, and deterministic decoders at the receivers. As pointed out in [2] , stochastic encoding, i.e. randomization in the encoder during transmission, increases secrecy by adding noise as a physical barrier to eavesdropping while deterministic decoding does not lose optimality for the case of interest.
As shown in Fig. 3 , Alice chooses a public/common message m out of a set of M possible messages to convey to both Bob and Eve, and a private/secret/confidential message l ∈ L only to Eve. (l ∈ L is a short-hand notation for l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.) Since the message m for Eve is a degraded version of the message (m, l) to Bob, this is identical to the asymmetric broadcasting of degraded message sets [3] except for the additional secrecy concern.
In the transmission phase, Alice first passes the message through a stochastic encoder denoted by the conditional probability distribution f ∈ P(X n ) M×L . We write f(m, l) as the output codeword, which is denoted by the dummy random n-
in Fig. 3 . The encoder can be viewed as an artificial channel, through which the output codeword X of the message (m, l) must satisfy Pr{X = x} = f (x|m, l). It effectively adds additional noise to make it hard for Eve to learn the secret. This artificial noise also affects Bob since he does no know it a priori.
Alice then transmits the random codeword X through n uses of the wiretap channel. The n-th extension of the wiretap channel is characterized by the n-th direct power (W 
) and similarly for W n e . Bob uses his channel output Y to decode both the public and private messages with a deterministic decoder
Similarly, Eve uses her channel output Z to decode the public message with decoder φ e : Z n → M and decision region Φ e : M → 2 Z n . She, however, also generates an unordered set of λ ≤ L distinct guesses of the secret using a list decoder
The triple (f, φ b , φ e ) will be called an (n-block) wiretap channel code, while the list decoder ψ will be called the list decoding attack (with deterministic list size). The quadruple (f, φ b , φ e , ψ) will be called an (n-block) transmission (model) for the wiretap channel.
B. Achievable rate and exponent triples
The performance of a wiretap channel code with respect to a list decoding attack is evaluated based on the following fault events.
Definition III.1 (Fault events)
. Let E b (m, l), E e (m, l) and S e (m, l) be the fault events that Bob decodes (m, l) wrong, Eve decodes m wrong, and Eve successfully guesses l respectively when (m, l) is the public and private message pair. i.e.
The corresponding (average) fault probabilities (over the message set M × L), e b , e e and s e can be computed as follows. We study the asymptotic properties when the sizes M and L of the message sets and λ of Eve's guessing list grow exponentially while the fault probabilities decay exponentially in n. The exponential rates are defined as follows.
e , ψ (n) ) (n ∈ Z + ) over the wiretap channel (W b , W e ), the public message rate R M , private message rate R L and the guessing rate R λ are defined as,
The exponents of the fault probabilities (3) are defined as,
(5b) (5c)
where e (n) b
and alike denotes e b evaluated with respect to the n-block transmission. For simplicity, the superscript (n) will be omitted hereafter if there is no ambiguity.
In the code design phase prior to the transmission phase, Alice chooses (f, φ b , φ e ) without knowledge of ψ and then Eve chooses ψ knowing Alice's choice. In particular, Eve chooses ψ to minimize S e so that her success probability s (n) e decays to zero as slowly as possible, while Alice chooses (f, φ b , φ e ) to make E b , E e and S e large so that the error probabilities e (n) b and e (n) e decay to zero fast for reliability, and the probability s (n) e of successful attack by Eve decays to zero fast for secrecy. The tradeoff between secrecy and reliability for Alice can be expressed in terms of the set of achievable rate and exponent triples defined as follows.
Definition III.3 (Achievable rate and exponent triples). The rate triple (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) ∈ R 3 + , where R + := {a ∈ R : a ≥ 0}, is achievable if there exists a sequence of wiretap channel codes (f, φ b , φ e ) with rates,
such that for any sequence of list decoding attack ψ with guessing rate R λ ≤ R 3 , the probabilities e b , e e and s e converge to zero as n → ∞.
The exponent triple
+ is achievable with respect to the rate triple if in addition that,
If the achievable exponents are strictly positive, the rate triple is said to be strongly achievable.
In the sequel, we will obtain an inner bound to the set of achievable exponent triples in the form of parameterized single-letter lower bounds, one for each exponent.
3 From this, 3 In response to the question of using average instead of maximum error probabilities (over the message set), we would like to point out that the particular inner bound to be derived also holds when e b and ee are defined as the corresponding maximum error probabilities and se as the average success probability. It follows from the usual argument of successively expurgating worst half of the codewords as in [6] , which turns out to preserve the desired overlap property of the code and hence the bound for the success exponent. (see Section V) If one defined se as the maximum probability however, the problem becomes degenerate since there is an obvious strategy for Eve to achieve se = 1.
an inner bound to the set of strongly achievable rate triples will be obtained, the closure of which coincides with the closure of the achievable region in Theorem 1 of [2] when the guessing rate is treated as equivocation rate.
IV. CODING SCHEME The coding scheme (i.e. the specification of the sequence of wiretap channel codes (f, φ b , φ e ), see Fig. 3 ) considered here is a merge of the schemes in [2] and [6] using the method of types developed by Csiszár [3] . We will describe each key component of the code in succession and explain how each of them simplifies the analysis of the fault events (see Definition III.1).
A. Constant composition code
As a first step, output of the stochastic encoder is restricted to constant composition code [3] defined as follows. Let N (x|x) denote the number of occurrences of symbol x ∈ X in the n-sequence x ∈ X n . The type or empirical distribution P x of x is defined as the probability mass function,
x ∈ X n } denote the set of all possible types of an n-sequence in X n . The type class T
(n)
Q := {x : P x = Q} or T Q for short denotes the set of all n-sequences x having type Q ∈ P n (X ). An n-block constant composition code θ on X is an ordered tuple of codewords all from the same type class on X . i.e. ∃Q ∈ P n (X ), θ ⊂ T Q .
Suppose θ is the constant composition code of type Q for the stochastic encoder f . Then, f (x|m, l) = 0 for all x / ∈ θ. From (3a),
and similarly for other probabilities in (3). To further simplify the expressions, define the canonical conditional type P y|x of y given x as,
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, where N (x, y|x, y) is the number of occurrences of the pair (x, y) in the n-sequence {(
of pairs. The canonical conditional type of y given x exists and is unique by definition. 4 However, with a canonical conditional type V given x specified, there can be more than one y satisfying it. 5 If V : X → Y is the conditional type of y given x, y is said to lie in T V (x), referred to as the V -shell of x or the conditional type class of V given x. In other words, T V (x) is the set of all y ∈ Y n with conditional type V given x.
Writing W n b (y|c) as the product x,y W b (y|x) N (x,y|c,y) , Lemma 1.2.6 of [3] gives, for all y ∈ T V (c),
where the conditional information divergence D(V W b |Q) and conditional entropy H(V |Q) are defined as,
(11)
The key implication is that W n b (y|c) depends on y only through the conditional type P y|c and channel output
or V n for short) be the set of all possible canonical conditional types of y given c. This set depends on c only through the type Q of c. 6 {T V (c) : V ∈ V n (Q)} is a partitioning of Y n for every c ∈ θ because every y has a unique canonical conditional type given c. We can therefore partition the probabilities by V n (Q) as follows. From (7),
where the last equality is due to the piecewise uniform distribution of the channel output W n b (c) implied by (9) . By Lemma 1.
Thus, e b can be upper bounded as,
B. Transmission of junk data and prefix DMC
In the previous section, the use of constant composition code simplifies the probability (3a) to (13) and similarly for other probabilities in (3) . In this section, we shall specify 6 For example, if y = 011 is in the V -shell of c = 011, then permutation y ′ = 110 of y is in the V -shell of the same permutation c ′ = 110 of c. In general, if V is a canonical type of some sequence y ∈ Y n given c ∈ θ then the V -shell of another codeword c ′ ∈ θ must contain a sequence y ′ ∈ Y n , namely the sequence obtained from y by the same permutation of c ∈ θ to c ′ ∈ θ. Thus, the set of all possible canonical conditional types are the same if the conditioning sequences have the same type. 7 The key step in the derivation is that
the structure of the stochastic encoder f and its uniform randomization over junk data as follows.
Consider indexing the codewords in θ as c jlm by j ∈ J, l ∈ L and m ∈ M . i.e.
(14)
θ := {c jlm } j∈J,l∈L,m∈M Set f(m, l) = c Jlm where the junk data J is a random variable Alice chooses uniformly randomly from {1, . . . , J}.
The conditional probability f is,
This approach of providing secrecy, illustrated in Example A.2 in the Appendix, will be called transmission of (uniformly random) junk data because J is not meant to be a message although it is encoded like one. 8 Substituting this into the upper bound of e b in (13) and similarly for the other fault probabilities gives the following expressions.
Lemma IV.1 (Constant composition code, transmission of junk data). Using n-block constant composition code θ in (14) of type Q ∈ P(X ) and the transmission of junk data approach (15), the probabilities in (3) can be upper bounded as follows,
where Avg j,l,m is over j ∈ J, l ∈ L and m ∈ M .
Note that the randomization in the encoder is equivalent to the averaging over the message augmented with junk data.
Another approach of randomization introduced in [2] is the prefix discrete memoryless channel (prefix DMC), which is characterized by the conditional probability distributioñ V ∈ P(X )X from some finite setX . The stochastic encoder first maps (m, l) into an n-sequence inX n , which is then fed through the extended prefix DMCṼ n before being transmitted through the channel. To combine this with the transmission of junk data approach, letf be the original stochastic encoder defined in (15) except that X is replaced byX , and θ is a constant composition code with type Q onX . Then, the new encoder is,
This is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) .
The prefix DMC can be viewed as part of the wiretap channel instead of the encoder as in Fig. 4 where the productṼ W b is the matrix multiplication. Thus, any performance metric, say e(W b , W e ), that one obtains without prefix discrete memoryless channel can be converted to the performance metric with prefixing discrete memoryless channel as e(Ṽ W b ,Ṽ W e ).
Because of this simplicity in extending any performance metrics with prefix DMC, we will leave this prefixing procedure to the very end and use the encoder defined in (15) for the main analysis. For a simple comparison between the prefix DMC and transmission of junk data approach, readers can refer to Example A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
C. Random code construction and MMI decoding
As a summary, encoder f encodes the public and private messages m and respectively l, and the junk data J into a codeword c Jlm in the constant composition code θ of type Q. The codeword is then transmitted through the wiretap channel (W b , W e ), to which a prefix a DMC {Ṽ } will be added in the end. The fault probabilities simplify to (16), with (W b , W e ) replaced by (Ṽ W b ,Ṽ W e ) for the prefix DMC. It remains to specify how the codebook θ and decoders (φ b , φ e ) should be constructed.
Csiszár and Körner [2] consider maximal code construction with typical set decoding for the wiretap channel. This cannot be used here since typical set decoding fails to give exponential decay rate for the error probabilities. We will adopt the random code construction scheme with maximum mutual information (MMI) decoding in [6] instead.
As a preliminary for the random code construction, some finite set U is chosen. The wiretap channel is trivially extended with an additional input symbol from U to (W b ∈ P(Y) U ×X , W e ∈ P(Z) U ×X ), where
for all (u, x) ∈ U × X . In the form of the stochastic transition function,
and W e (u, x) := W e (x), which means that the extended channel simply ignores the additional input symbol. Thus, this trivial extension is purely conceptual and does not change the original problem.
As the first step in the random code construction, a type Q 0 ∈ P n (U) on U is chosen for the constraint length n. Then, each of the set Θ 0 := {U m } m∈M of n-sequences is uniformly randomly and independently (u.i.) chosen from the type class T Q0 . i.e.
are combined into one codeword C jlm := U m • X jlm , where • denotes the element-wise concatenation. i.e.
The i-th term C
jlm ) is transmitted in the ith use of the (extended) wiretap channel. The random code Θ is defined as the ordered structure {C jlm } j∈J,l∈L,m∈M . Its type is denoted as Q ∈ P n (U, X ) where
Definition IV.1 (Random code). The random code Θ of type
for the extended wiretap channel (17) is defined as follows,
In words, it is the set of codewords C jlm indexed by the messages j ∈ J, l ∈ L and m ∈ M . Each codeword consists of an n-sequence U m that belong to the random codebook Θ 0 , and an n-sequence X jlm that belongs to the random codebook Θ 1 (m). The codewords from Θ 0 are selected u.i. from the type class T Q0 and the codewords from Θ 1 (m) are selected u.i. from the
This approach of random code construction is well-known in the asymmetric broadcasting channel setting. Θ 0 is used to partition X n into cells/clouds {T Q1 (U m )} m that are intended to be well distinguishable through the channels of both Bob and Eve, and Θ 1 (m) are the set of codewords selected from the containing cell that are intended to be well distinguishable by Bob but not necessarily so by Eve. The addition of input symbol from U gives an additional degree of freedom in optimizing the average performance of the code.
It is important to note that, unlike the randomness in the stochastic encoding, the randomness in the codebook is known to all parties (Alice, Bob and Eve). The randomization happens in the code design phase before the public and private messages are generated for the transmission phase.
With the structure of the codebook defined, we can now complete the specification of the coding scheme with the maximum mutual information (MMI) decoder for Bob and Eve. Consider a particular realization θ of the random code Θ. Let I(Q, V ) denote the mutual information,
Then, I(c∧y), referred to as the empirical mutual information between x and y, are defined as, (6), (8) Suppose Bob observes y ∈ Y n through his channel. He searches for the codeword c ∈ θ that maximizes the empirical mutual information I(c ∧ y). 9 If there is a unique c jlm that achieves the maximum, he declares m as the public message and l as the private message. More precisely,
Similarly, suppose Eve receives z. She searches for the unique u m that achieves the maximum max u∈θ0 I(u ∧ z). We will not need to assume any structure for ψ other than the fact it has to be a deterministic list decoder with fixed list size λ. 11 The coding scheme without prefix DMC can now be summarized as follows.
Definition IV.2 (Coding scheme). The coding scheme without prefix DMC for a realization θ of the random code in Definition IV.1 is defined as follows. Encoding: Alice generates the junk data J uniformly randomly from {1, . . . , J} and encodes the common message m ∈ M and secret l ∈ L into (u m , x Jlm ) ∈ θ. She only transmits X Jlm through the channel. The encoding function is therefore,
Decoding: If Bob receives y, he finds a codeword c ∈ θ that maximizes the empirical mutual information I(c ∧ y) and use 9 Note that the optimal decoding rule is the maximum likelihood decoding instead. MMI decoding is adopted here for simplicity. 10 One may think that Eve can search for the unique c jlm that achieves the maximum max c∈θ I(c ∧ z), and declare m as the public message. Because of the suboptimality of the MMI decoding and the random code construction, this choice turns out to be unfavorable. 11 It is clear, however, that the optimal ψ is an extension of the maximum likelihood decoding rule with λ estimates instead of one.
its z; θ) etc.. However, for notational simplicity, the dependence on θ will be omitted.
Using the random coding scheme, we can further bound the fault probabilities (16) with the expected fault probabilities over the random code ensemble as follows. From (16a), the expectation of e b over the random code Θ is,
where the last inequality is due to the Type Counting Lemma |V n (Q)| ≤ (n + 1) |X ||Y| . 12 The expectation of e e and s e can be upper bounded similarly. By the union bound,
+ Pr{e e (Θ) > 3 E(ee(Θ))} + Pr{s e (Θ) > 3 E(se(Θ))} which is < 1 due to the Markov inequality Pr(A > α E(A)) < 1/α for non-negative random variable A and α > 0. Thus, the complement of the event has positive probability, which implies existence of a realization θ of Θ such that the fault probabilities can be bounded simultaneously as follows,
where s is defined as follows,
(24b)
and Φ e (m, l) := Φ e (m), Ψ(m, l) := Ψ(l) are the trivial extensions for all (m, l) ∈ M × L.
To compute the desired exponents, we consider a sequence of random codes defined as follows.
Definition IV.3 (Sequence of random codes). {Θ
(n) } or simply Θ denotes a sequence of random codes Θ (n) (see Definition IV.1) of type
Furthermore, J (n) grows exponentially at the junk data rate
for any Q (n) • V (n) converging to Q • V in variation distance, then Bob's error exponent (5a) can be lower bounded as,
and similarly for other exponents E e and S e in (5). 
In the sequel, we will compute γ b , γ e and γ to obtain the desired lower bounds of the exponents.
V. SUCCESS EXPONENT
From Lemma IV.2, to obtain a lower bound of the achievable 13 success exponent S e (5c), it suffices to compute a lower bound γ(V ) on the exponent of the expected average fraction β(V, Θ, Ψ) for any Ψ satisfying the guessing rate (4c).
Consider first some realization θ of the random code Θ in Definition IV.1.
since |T V (c jlm )| depends on c jlm only through its type Q (and n). The fraction can be made small if j |Ψ(l) ∩ T V (c jlm )| on the R.H.S. is made small for each l and m. Imagine Ψ(l)
13 Achievable here does not refer to achievable by Eve, but achievable by Alice as defined in Definition III.3.
Not well spread Well spread Fig. 5 . Effectiveness of stochastic encoding as a net that Eve uses to cover the shells {T V (c jlm ) : j ∈ J} owned by Alice as much as possible. Roughly speaking, since the net cannot be too large due to the list size constraint, Alice should spread out the shells as much as possible to minimize her loss. We will refer to this heuristically desired property of θ that the V -shells {T V (c jlm ) : j ∈ J} spread out for every V , m and l as the overlap property. 14 This is illustrated in Fig. 5 , in which the configuration on the left has 3 j=1 |Ψ(1)∩ T V (c j11 )| three times larger than the one on the right.
Intuitively, random code has the overlap property on average since it uniformly spaces out the codewords. This is made precise with the following Overlap Lemma.
Lemma V.1 (Overlap)
. Let X j (j = 1, . . . , J) be an nsequence uniformly and independently drawn from T
where 1 is the indicator function and n 0 is some integer-valued function that depends only on δ and |X ||Z|.
In words, the lemma states that the chance of having exponentially (exp(nδ)) many shells (from {T V (X j ) : j ∈ J}) overlapping at a spot (z) is doubly exponentially decaying (exp(− exp(nδ))), provided that the shells are not enough to fill the entire space (T QV ⊂ Z n ) they can possibly reside. (i.e. J ≤ ⌊exp{nI(Q, V )}⌋) For the case of interest, we will prove the following more general form of the lemma with conditioning.
Lemma V.2 (Overlap (with conditioning)). Let
) be a joint type, U be a random variable distributed over T Q0 , and X j (j = 1, . . . , J) be an n-sequence uniformly and independently drawn from
where • denotes element-wise concatenation (18), and
denotes the conditional mutual information. (cf. (19))
Proof: For notational simplicity, consider the case when exp(nδ) and exp{nI(Q 1 , V |Q 0 )} are integers. 15 Consider some subset J of {1, . . . , J} with |J | = exp(nδ). Since the events z ∈ T V (U • X j ) (j = 1, . . . , J) are conditionally mutually independent given U = u ∈ T Q0 ,
, where the last inequality is by Lemma A.1 using the uniform distribution of X j and Lemma 1.2.5 of [3] on the cardinality bounds of conditional type class. Since exp{nI(Q 1 , V |Q 0 )} ≥ J, the number of distinct choices of J is,
where the last inequality is by Lemma A.2. By the union bound, L.H.S. of (28) is upper bounded by the product of the last two expressions, i.e.
Substituting the previously derived bounds for each term gives the desired upper bound exp(− exp(nδ)) when n ≥ n 0 (δ, |U||X |).
Consider now a sequence of random codes Θ (n) defined in Definition IV.3. The desired bound on the exponent of β(V, Θ, Ψ) can be computed as follows using the Overlap Lemma.
Lemma V.3 (Success exponent).
Consider the random code sequence Θ defined in Definition IV.3. For any sequence of list decoding attack ψ satisfying the guessing rate R λ (4c),
The case when exp(nδ) and I(Q 1 , V |Q 0 ) are not integers can be derived by taking their ceilings or floors and grouping the fractional increments into some dominating terms.
where |a| + := max{0, a} and |a| − := min{0, a}.
Proof: By the Overlap Lemma V.2, for any δ > 0 and n ≥ n 0 (δ),
where Θ 0 is the codebook {U m } m∈M , θ 0 is an arbitrary realization, and {J k (V )} k∈KV is a partitioning of {1, . . . , J} defined as,
The expectation of the sum of indicators on the left can then be bounded as follows,
where the last inequality is true for n ≥ n 0 (δ,
By linearity of expectation,
Summing both sides over l ∈ L and applying the list size constraint on Ψ in Lemma A.3 to the R.H.S.,
Averaging both sides over m ∈ M , dividing by the constant JL |T V (C jlm )| and taking the expectation over all possible realizations of θ 0 gives,
To compute the desired exponent from the last inequality, denote the inequality in the exponent . as follows, (30) a n . b n ⇐⇒ lim sup n→∞ 1 n log a n ≤ lim inf
Combining these, β(V, Θ, Ψ) is . the following expression,
To obtain the desired bound, simplify this with the identity |a| − ≡ a − |a| + , and the fact that β(V, Θ, Ψ) ≤ 1.
VI. ERROR EXPONENTS
The desired error exponents can be obtained directly from the achievability result in [6] by grouping (j, l) ∈ J × L as one private message for Bob. This is because the error exponent that Bob decodes the private message wrong lower bounds the exponent that Bob decodes the secret wrong. 16 For completeness, we provide a similar derivation in this section. Readers familiar with [6] and may skip to the next section.
In essence of Lemma IV.2, the error exponents for Bob and Eve can be obtained by lower bounding the exponents of the fractions β(V, Θ, Φ c b ) and respectively β(V, Θ, Φ c e ). Thus, the objective is to prove the following lemma.
Lemma VI.1 (Error exponents). Consider the sequence of random code Θ in Definition IV.3, and the MMI decoder (decision region map)
and φ e (Φ e ) (22) for Bob and respectively Eve. Then,
A. Exponent for Bob
In essence of Lemma IV.2, the error exponent for Bob can be obtained by lower bounding the exponent of the fraction,
where Θ is the sequence of random codes in Definition IV.3 and Φ b is the decision region of the MMI decoder
is the set of bad observations in the Vshell of C jlm that lead to error if C jlm is transmitted. With the MMI decoder (21), this corresponds to the set of y ∈ T V (C jlm ) that has I(C jlm ∧ y) no larger than I(C j ′ l ′ m ′ ∧ y) for some misleading codeword
16 Since Bob can also decode the junk data as reliably as the secret, one may potentially transmit meaningful data instead of the junk provided that the data is uniformly random and need not be secured at the same level as the secret.
where corresponds to the indices of misleading codewords that result in decoding the private message wrong but decoding the public message correctly.
17 By the union bound,
Consider the second summation where
′ by the uniqueness of (canonical conditional) types. Since the premise implies I(Q 0 , Q 1 V ) = I(Q 0 , Q 1 V ′ ), we can impose this constraint (temporarily) in the second summation without affecting the sum. Under this equality constraint, however, the inequality constraint
. Withdrawing the equality constraint gives the following upper bound,
To bound the expectation on the left, it suffices to bound the expectation of |T V (C jlm ) ∩ T V ′ (C j ′ l ′ m ′ )| on the right by the Packing Lemma [3] , which is stated in a convenient form with conditioning in Lemma A. 4 .
Applying the Packing Lemma without conditioning gives, for all δ > 0, n > n 0 (δ, |U||X |),
Combining the last three inequalities, we have for n sufficiently large that,
where we have used the fact that |W (1) (m)| = JL(M −1) and |W (2) (m, l)| = J(L−1); replaced I(Q, V ′ ) and I(Q 1 , V ′ |Q 0 ) by their minima I(Q, V ) and respectively I(Q 1 , V |Q 0 ) which correspond to the most slowly decaying terms; and applied the Type Counting Lemma to |V n (Q)|. Hence,
B. Exponent for Eve
The exponent of β(V, Θ, Φ c e ) for Eve can be calculated analogously. With MMI decoding Φ c e (m)∩T V (C jlm ) is the set of z ∈ T V (C jlm ) that has I(U m ∧z) no larger than I(U m ′ ∧z) for some misleading codeword U m ′ where m
where the set of problematic conditional types for Eve is
Since C jlm is independent of U m ′ where m ′ = m, the Packing Lemma A.4 without conditioning (but withQ assigned as Q 0 , andV assigned as Q 1 V ′ ) gives, for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |U|),
Substituting this into the previous inequality, we have for n sufficiently large that,
where we have replaced I(Q 0 , Q 1 V ′ ) by it minimum I(Q 0 , Q 1 V ). The exponent is therefore,
which completes the proof the Lemma VI.1
VII. RESULTS
The exponents of β(V, Θ, Ψ), β(V, Θ, Φ c b ) and β(V, Θ, Φ c e ) calculated in Lemma V.3 and Lemma VI.1 using the random code in Definition IV.3 and the coding scheme in Definition IV.2 give an initial set of lower bounds to the exponents by Lemma IV.2. As discussed in Section IV-B, the bounds can then be extended with prefixed DMCṼ by rewriting
To obtain the final version of the bounds, consider the following rate reallocation: move the first R ∈ [0, R L ] bits of the secret to the end of the public message, and encode them with a wiretap channel code at rate (R M + R, R L − R).
Theorem VII.1 (Inner bound of achievable exponent triples).

For every rate triple
, transitional probability matrixṼ ∈ P(X ) U ×X , the exponent triple (E b , E e , S e ) satisfying the following is achievable (see Definition III.3) for the wiretap channel {W b , W e }.
From this, we can compute an inner bound to the region of strongly achievable rate triple for which above inner bound to the achievable exponent triple are all strictly positive. To simplify notation, let (U,X, X, Y, Z) be some random variables distributed as
is zero at V = W and positive otherwise, the exponents are positive iff, for
R and R J can be eliminated without loss of optimality by the Fourier-Motzkin elimination [10] (see Lemma A.5), which gives the following.
Theorem VII.2 (Inner bound of strongly achievable rate triples
). (R M , R L , R λ ) is strongly achievable for the wiretap channel {W b : X → Y, W e : X → Z} if (32a) (32b) (32c) (32d) (32e) 0 ≤ R λ < R L R λ < I(X ∧ Y|U) − I(X ∧ Z|U) 0 ≤ R M < I(U ∧ Z) R M + R λ < I(U ∧ Y) + I(X ∧ Y|U) − I(X ∧ Z|U) R M + R L < I(X ∧ Y|U) + min{I(U ∧ Y), I(U ∧ Z)} for some (U,X) → X → YZ with P Y|X = W b and P Z|X = W e .
It is admissible to have U as a deterministic function ofX and
The admissible constraints are obtained from [2] as described in Lemma A.6. They can be imposed without changing the inner bound. Example A.4 illustrates how to compute an inner bound of the achievable rate tuples using the MultiParametric Toolbox [7] in Matlab.
The closure of the rate region of (R M , R L , R λ ) is indeed equivalent to the closure of the rate region of (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) in Theorem 1 of [2] . More precisely, we have the following.
Proposition VII.3 (Equivalent rate region). Let R be the inner bound of strongly achievable rate tuples
(R M , R L , R λ ) in Theorem VII.2
, and R
′ be the set of rate tuples that satisfies,
Hence, R is convex by Lemma 5 of [2] and the closure of its projection on (R M , R L ) is the rate region for the asymmetric broadcast channel by Corollary 5 of [2] . Suppose W b is more capable [5] than W e , i.e. I(X ∧ Y) ≥ I(X ∧ Z) for all P X ∈ P(X ). Then it is admissible to haveX = X (i.e. no prefix DMC) by a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 3 in [2] . It also follows that 0 ≤ R λ < max P X [I(X ∧ Y) − I(X ∧ Z)] is the projection of R on R λ . Assume the stronger condition that W b is less noisy [5] than W e , i.e. I(U ∧ Y) ≥ I(U ∧ Z) for any U → X → YZ. Then, by Theorem 3 in [2] , it is addmissible to have U deterministic in addition toX = X to obtain the projection on (R L , R λ ).
Proof of Proposition VII.3: Without loss of generality, consider some U →X → X → YZ with U ∩X = ∅. Let U α be a random variable such that it isX with probability α and U with probability 1 − α, and that 1{U α =X} is independent of (U,X, X, Y, Z).
18 Then,
and similarly for Z. Thus, we can define R α and R ′ α as the corresponding rate polytopes defined by the linear constraints in (32) and (33) respectively.
If we impose (33c) on R 0 , the resulting polytope is the same as R 
RM RL
, contains R 0 primarily because the hyperplane of (32c) and (32d) for R 0 intersects at,
which is contained by the half-space (33b) (with non-strict inequality instead) for R ′ α . This is illustrated in Fig. 6 . For comparison, R 0 is plotted with blue dotted frame in each sub-figure. It is contained by the convex hull in Fig. 6(c) as expected.
Finally, consider the case
19 Then, Hull(R ′ 0 , R ′ α ) contains R 0 primarily because the hyperplane of (32d) intersects with the plane R λ = 0 at,
which is contained by the half-space (with non-strict inequality) of (33c) for R ′ α . This is illustrated in Fig. 7 . Hence, we have R 0 a subset of Hull(R ′ 0 , R ′ α ) for some α ∈ (0, 1), which implies R ⊂ R ′ as desired.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In doubt of a unifying measure of security, we have considered success exponent as an alternative to equivocation rate for the wiretap channel considered in [2] . We replace the maximal code construction and typical set decoding in [2] with the random coding scheme and maximum empirical 19 If I(X ∧ Z|U) = 0, choose α to approach 1 from below to ensure that
mutual information decoding in [6] . The lower bounds on the error exponents follow from [6] with the well-known Packing Lemma (see Lemma A.4), while the lower bound on the success exponent is obtained with the approach of [4] and a technique we call the Overlap Lemma (see Lemma V.2). This lemma gives a doubly exponential behavior that enables us to guarantee good realization of the random code for effective stochastic encoding by transmission of junk data (see Section IV-B). Combining with the prefix DMC technique in [2] that adds artificial memoryless noise to the channel input symbols, and a rate reallocation step of transferring some secret bits to the public message before encoding (see Section VII), we obtain the final inner bound of the achievable exponent triples in Theorem VII.1 with the corresponding strongly achievable rate triples in Theorem VII.2. Proposition VII.3 shows that this inner bound to the rate region is convex and coincides with the region of achievable rate triples in Theorem 1 of [2] . It is a straightforward extension to consider the maximum error exponents and average success exponent over the messages. The same bound follows by the usual expurgation argument and a more careful application of the doubly exponential behavior of the Overlap Lemma. Whether this tradeoff is optimal, however, is unclear. It would be surprising if one can further improve the tradeoff by improving the coding scheme.
APPENDIX
Example A.1 (Maximum a priori and aposteriori success probability). Consider the following probability matrix, P Z := from which the a priori probability is P S = 3 4 1 4 . Without knowing Z, Eve guesses S successfully with probability at most 3 4 if one guess is allowed, and 1 if two guesses are allowed. If she knows Z, she still has the same maximum probability of success in each case because the most probable candidate for the secret is the same regardless of whether Z is observed. Hence, Eve cannot achieve a better success probability regardless of Z, even though Z is not independent of S. Success probability fails to express the notion of perfect secrecy in this sense.
Example A.2 (Transmission of junk data). Consider the case when there is no public message, and the coding is not restricted to constant composition code. Fig. 8 illustrates the approach of transmission of junk data through a wiretap channel, which consists of a binary noiseless channel for Bob and a binary erasure channel for Eve. While the channel input is perfectly observed by Bob, half of it is erased on average before it reaches Eve. Alice exploits this by sending one bit of junk J uniformly distributed in {0, 1} together with one bit of secret l ∈ {0, 1} in two channel uses. The channel input is X = (J, J ⊕ l) where ⊕ denotes the XOR operation. Bob can recover the secret perfectly by the decoder φ b (y) := y (1) ⊕ y (2) since his observation Y is equal to X. Eve can use the same decoding if there is no erasure. However, if there is one or more erasures, her observation Z becomes independent of the secret, in which case she should uniformly randomly pick 0 or 1 as her guess to minimize the conditional error probability, provided that she can only make one guess. 20 Thus, the conditional error probability is 0 if there is no erasure, which happens with probability 1/4, and 1/2 otherwise. The overall conditional error probability is 3/8.
Note that if Alice uses a prefix DMC as described in Section IV-B, Bob cannot achieve zero error probability. In 20 We allow stochastic decoding here since the focus is the probability at block length n = 2 instead of the exponent when n → ∞.
other words, prefix DMC is strictly inferior in this case.
21
Example A.3 (Prefix discrete memoryless channel). Consider prefixing the wiretap channel {W b : X → Y, W e : X → Z} with the discrete memoryless channel {Ṽ } defined in Fig. 9 . Each arrow connects an input alphabet to an output alphabet if the corresponding transition probability, labeled in the arrow, is non-zero. Consider the case without prefixing the wiretap
2 2 1 ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 
2 ( ( .5PP P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 0 0
r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r
(e)Ṽ We Fig. 9 . An example of prefix discrete memoryless channel channel withṼ . Since W b is a weakly symmetric channel, the capacity is 1 bit by the capacity formula for weakly symmetric in Theorem 8.2.1 of [1] . Bob can achieve the capacity of 1 bit with zero error probability and a single use of the channel iff Alice encodes 1 bit of information using any of the following codebooks θ(1) := {00, 10}, θ(2) := {00, 11}, θ(3) := {01, 10} and θ(4) := {01, 11}. If Alice wants to have zero error probability for Bob in n channel uses with rate n bits, the codebook has to be some concatenation of codebooks from {θ(i)} 4 i=1 . However, the channel input X n would not be independent of the channel output Z n to Eve. To argue this, consider the i-th channel use only. Suppose Alice uses θ(1) to encode a uniformly random bit at that time slot. Then, given Z (i) = 0, we have X (i) = 10 with probability 2/3 rather than the prior probability 1/2. The other cases can be argued similarly. In short, not randomizing over the 21 It would be more interesting to find an example in which prefix DMC is inferior even if Bob's probability of error cannot be made to 0 by adding noise with memory like what the transmission of junk data does.
code unavoidably leaks information to Eve. However, if the randomization is done by transmitting junk data, the useful data rate would drop below the capacity 1 bit.
Consider prefixing the wiretap channel withṼ . The prefixed channelṼ W b to Bob is a noiseless binary channel as shown in Fig. 9(d) . The prefixed channelṼ W e to Eve, however, is completely noisy as shown in Fig. 9(e) . One can check that the channel output Z is independent of X for any input distribution on X. Thus, Alice can transmit at the capacity 1 bit with zero error probability for Bob but without leaking any information to Eve. Prefixing discrete memoryless channel is strictly better than transmitting junk data in this case.
where the last inequality holds for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |U||X |); (U, X, Z) in the first equality is a random tuple with joint distribution P U,X,Z := Q 0 •Q 1 •V ; T P X|U,Z is denoted by T X|U,Z and similarly for others; and T X|U,Z (u, z) with (u, z) ∈ T U,Z is denoted by T X|U,Z .
Proof: Consider z ∈ T QV , for which the desired probability is non-zero. Since u ∈ T U , X ∈ T X|U (u), and z ∈ T Z , the event that {z ∈ T V (u • X)}, or equivalently, {z ∈ T Z|U,X (u • X)}, happens iff (u, X, z) ∈ T U,X,Z . This happens iff X ∈ T X|U,Z (u, z). Hence, for all z ∈ T Z ,
where the last inequality is true for all n ≥ n 0 (δ, |U||X |) due to Lemma 1.2.5 of [3] that 
Setting x = b/a gives the desired inequality. . Consider some finite sets U, X and Y, type Q 0 ∈ P n (U), and canonical conditional types
be the corresponding joint types; U be some random n-sequence distributed over T Q0 ; X andX be independently and uniformly randomly drawn from T Q1 (U) and TQ
Proof: Consider some realization u ∈ T Q0 of U. By conditional independence between X andX,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma A.1 (both the equality and inequality cases) ∀n ≥ n 0 (δ, Proof: Consider applying the Fourier-Motzkin elimination. From (31) and R ∈ [0, R L ], we have,
Adding each of the first two inequalities to the next four eliminates R, which, together with R J ≥ 0, gives,
where we have removed some inactive constraints. Adding each of the first two inequalities to the next three inequalities eliminates R J , which gives (32) as desired. The prefix DMC is noiseless, i.e. X =X. The channel and U are constructed based on Counter-example 2 in [5] with slight modifications. 22 Define the Bayes' rule, conditional mutual information and entropy functions as follows. f u n c t i o n PXY= b a y e s (PYX, PX ) % compute P X|Y from P Y|X and P X PXY= r e p m a t ( PX , s i z e (PYX, 2 ) , 1 ) . * PYX ' ; PXY=PXY . / r e p m a t ( sum (PXY, 2 ) , 1 , s i z e (PXY , 2 ) ) ; f u n c t i o n IQVP= I (Q , V, P ) % compute I(Q, V |P ) i f na r g i n<3 P= o n e s ( 1 , s i z e (Q , 1 ) ) . / s i z e (Q , 1 ) ; end IQVP=H(Q * V , P)−H(V , P * Q ) ; f u n c t i o n h=H(Q, P ) % compute H(Q|P ) Q(Q= = 0 ) = 1 ; h=−P * sum ( l o g 2 (Q ) . * Q , 2 ) ; Then, the mutual information expressions required for the rate region can be computed as follows.
% derived values PU = PtX * PUtX ; PtXU = b a y e s ( PUtX , PtX ) ; % P U and PX |U PYtX=PXtX * PYX ; PYU=PtXU * PYtX ; % P Y|X and P Y|U PZtX=PXtX * PZX ; PZU=PtXU * PZtX ; % P Z|X and P Z|U IUY= I ( PU , PYU ) ; ItXYU= I ( PtXU , PYtX , PU ) ; % I(U ∧ Y) and I(X ∧ Y|U) IUZ= I ( PU , PZU ) ; ItXZU= I ( PtXU , PZtX , PU ) ; % I(U ∧ Z) and I(X ∧ Z|U)
Using the Multi-Parametric Toolbox [7] , we first define the polytope satisfying the constraints from (31) on (R, R J , R M , R L , R λ ); and then project it to (R M , R L , R λ ), which should give the desired region in (32). Proof: Since the following proof is a minor extension to [2, (A.22)], we will give only the changes as follows. Readers should refer to [2] for details. 
